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Leibnizian relationalism for general
relativistic physics
Antonio Vassallo∗, Michael Esfeld†
An ontology of Leibnizian relationalism, consisting in distance relations
among sparse matter points and their change only, is well recognized as a
serious option in the context of classical mechanics. In this paper, we inves-
tigate how this ontology fares when it comes to general relativistic physics.
Using a Humean strategy, we regard the gravitational field as a means to
represent the overall change in the distance relations among point particles
in a way that achieves the best combination of being simple and being infor-
mative.
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1 Leibnizian relationalism
Leibnizian relationalism is the view that there are only distance relations among sparse
discrete, unextended objects – let’s call them “matter points”. There neither is an under-
lying space in which these objects and their relations are embedded nor an underlying
time in which these relations evolve. Leibnizian relationalism has been considered hith-
erto only in the framework of classical mechanics. The aim of this paper is to investigate
whether and how this view can be applied to general relativistic physics. We are not
concerned with justifying Leibnizian relationalism. Whatever the merits and drawbacks
of relationalism in general may be, we take it that from a systematic point of view,
Leibnizian relationalism is the strongest form of relationalism and that from a historical
point of view, it has been established as a serious option in the framework of classical me-
chanics. These facts motivate to enquire whether and how this view can be put to work
in general relativistic physics as well, independently of whether or not one eventually
endorses Leibnizian relationalism.
In the following, we set out a philosophical interpretation of general relativistic physics
as being committed to no more than the ontology of Leibnizian relationalism, thereby
also making use of the duality between general relativity theory (GR) and shape dynam-
ics. Our aim is to show how a non-relationalist theory like GR can go with a relationalist
ontology, thus having the best of two worlds so to speak: the standard physical theory
of gravitation, and a most parsimonious philosophical proposal for an ontology of the
natural world.
In order to bring out Leibnizian relationalism as the strongest form of relationism, it
can be formulated in terms of only the following two axioms:
Axiom 1 There are distance relations that individuate objects, namely matter points.
Axiom 2 The matter points are permanent, with the distances between them changing.
There hence is no ontological commitment to any surplus structure: by the axioms
of this ontology, any ontological difference is a physical difference in the configuration
of matter. On this basis, the attractiveness of Leibnizian relationalism consists in the
fact that it is a very parsimonious ontology of the natural world. If there is a plurality
of objects, there has to be a certain type of relations in virtue of which these objects
make up a configuration that then is the world. When it comes to the natural world, the
issue are relations that qualify as providing for extension. That is the reason to single
out distance relations. In virtue of these relations, there is a configuration of matter
that is constituted through variation in the distances that connect sparse, unextended
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objects and that make it that these are matter points. Change in these relations then
is sufficient for empirical adequacy, given that all the evidence in physics comes down
to relative particle positions and their change. That is why the two axioms above are
minimally sufficient to formulate an ontology of the natural world.
The distance relation is irreflexive, symmetric and connex (meaning that all particles
in a configuration must be related). Moreover, any representation of distances has to
satisfy the triangle inequality. Any further means used to characterize these relations is
just descriptive fluff, such as e.g. using the Euclidean distance formula to label the rela-
tions in a configuration. Employing the distances to individuate the objects that stand in
these relations implies this: if matter point i is distinct from matter point j, there exists
at least one other matter point k such that matter points i and j are distinguished by
their relation to k. If there are only matter points connected by distances, all change is
change in the distance relations among the permanent matter points. Time then derives
from change. Following Leibniz, time is the order of succession (see notably third letter
to Newton-Clarke, § 4, and fourth letter, § 41 in Gerhardt, 1890, pp. 363, 376). Hence,
there is no time without change; but the change in the universal configuration of matter
exhibits an order, and what makes this order temporal is that it is unique and has a
direction, which means that by “instants of time” we just refer to an arbitrary monoton-
ically increasing parametrization of a sequence of changes in a universal configuration.
This then implies that the topology of time is absolute. However, there is no absolute
metric of time, because there is no external measure of time: the only meaningful way
to define a metric is to choose a reference subsystem within the universal configuration
of matter relative to which the rate of change in distance relations is measured.
Employing the distance relations to individuate the physical objects so that the Leib-
nizian principle of the identity of indiscernables is respected comes at a price: any model
of this ontology has to include at least three matter points and has to comply with the
mentioned requirements on the distance relation. In particular, a symmetrical universal
configuration of matter is thus ruled out, including a dynamics that leads to such a
configuration. However, this is no objectionable restriction: having empirical adequacy
in mind, there is no need to admit, e.g., worlds with only one or two objects or entirely
symmetrical worlds as physically possible worlds. This consequence just underlines that
this ontology is most parsimonious, avoiding the commitment to any surplus structure.
The ontology is exhausted by the two mentioned axioms. These axioms do not include
any primitive geometrical requirements: they do not suggest, for instance, a three-
dimensional or four-dimensional space, or Euclidean geometry, to represent the distances
and their change. The choice of a geometry is our construction of a space to achieve
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a representation of the change in the distance relations in the overall configuration of
matter throughout the history of the universe that is as simple and as informative about
that change as possible. The same goes for dynamical parameters that are attributed to
the matter points taken individually (e.g. mass, charge, spin) or to their configuration
(e.g. total energy, a wave function), constants of nature, forces, fields and the like: they
do not belong to the ontology. They are our means to formulate laws in the guise of
dynamical equations that allow us to represent the evolution of the configuration of
matter in a manner that is both as simple and as informative as possible.
2 Relationalist ontology and non-relationalist physical theory
Leibnizian relationalism as defined by the two axioms above is an example of what a
naturalized metaphysics can be like, being cut down to what is minimally sufficient to
account for the evidence that we have of the natural world. However, it is opposed to
a positivist metaphysics in the following sense: it rejects reading ontological commit-
ments off from the formalisms of physical theories. The formalisms are not the guide
to ontology, but parsimony and coherence together with empirical adequacy are. The
reason is that simplicity in ontology and simplicity in representation pull in opposite
directions: using only the concepts that describe what there is on the simplest ontol-
ogy (matter points individuated by distance relations), the description of the evolution
of the configuration of matter would not be simple at all, since one could only write
down an extremely long list that enumerates all the change. Reading one’s ontological
commitments off from the simplest description – such as e.g. Newtonian mechanics –,
the ontology would not be simple at all: it would in this case be committed to absolute
space and time, to momenta, gravitational masses, forces, etc.
Consequently, it is a misunderstanding to require from a relationalist ontology that
it should lead to a relationalist physical theory in the sense of a physical theory that
employs only the means that define the relationalist ontology. If relationalism is pushed
as far as done here for it to come out as a most parsimonious ontology of the natural
world that avoids any commitment to surplus structure, this is outright impossible. No
given configuration of matter, as defined only by the distance relations among the matter
points, contains information about the change in these relations.
Furthermore, even the most detailed relationalist physical theory, namely the best-
matching dynamics worked out by Barbour and Bertotti (1982) and Barbour (2012),
cannot avoid the commitment to primitive geometrical facts: the relational configuration
space that Barbour constructs is called “shape space”, because each configuration in it is
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individuated by its form and not by its size. However, the very concept of shape requires
primitive facts about angles to be meaningful, so that Barbour’s ontology has to include
a conformal structure. This is no criticism of Barbour’s project. It just underlines that
when it comes to a physical theory, more representational means are needed than what
is provided by the sparse Leibnizian ontology, although this ontology is fully empirically
adequate.
One can have the best of these two worlds – i.e. a parsimonious ontology and a simple
physical theory – by putting the Leibnizian relationalist ontology in the framework of
Humeanism, although we are not concerned here with the metaphysics of modality: the
network of distance relations among matter points and its change throughout the entire
history of the universe is the Humean mosaic. Everything else supervenes on this mosaic
in the sense that it comes in as a means to represent that change in a way that achieves
the best combination of being simple and being informative. Consequently, whatever
geometrical and dynamical parameters a physical theory employs over and above distance
relations and their change, these parameters do not belong to the ontology, but are only
a descriptive means. In a nutshell, Humeanism allows us to interpret a non-relationalist
physical theory in a cogent manner that is consistent with scientific realism as being
committed to no more than a parsimonious relationalist ontology.
Huggett (2006) applied this strategy to Newtonian mechanics. The decisive step is
to realize that genuinely spatiotemporal properties such as absolute acceleration and
geometrical facts regarding the embedding of a relational configuration in an absolute
space do not supervene on any given relational configuration, but on the entire history
of relational change. This history exhibits certain patterns or regularities, which enable
us to single out the idea of inertial motion in a background space as a particularly simple
and regular motion. Huggett (2006) employs the concept of adapted frame, that is, a
reference frame tied to a body (e.g. a material particle). More precisely, an adapted
frame amounts to an assignment of real numbers at a given time, that is, a set of N -
tuples such that (i) the origin of the frame – the (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0) tuple – corresponds to
the “position” at time zero of the body the frame is adapted to and (ii) the distances
along the N axes correspond to the distances (i.e. the numerical labeling of distance
relations) from the body. Inertial frames then are those frames in which an observer
would describe the history of relations in the simplest and strongest way in terms of
Newton’s laws. Note that there might be no body tied to an inertial frame; nonetheless,
any other adapted frame can be related to an inertial one by means of a spatial rigid
translation. Roughly, a spatial translation from a frame O into another one O′ amounts
to “shifting” the set of N -tuples constituting O by a certain factor (defined, e.g., by
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a suitable continuous function that takes an N -tuple in O as input and gives back an
N -tuple in O′), such that the relative distances between particles remain unaltered in
the new frame.
It is important to stress once again the fact that this construction does not require
any ontological commitment over and above those entailed by axioms 1 and 2. Choices
such as the dimensionality N of space or the numerical labeling of distance relations in
a configuration are in fact entirely arbitrary, the only constraint being, obviously, that
such choices enable the best possible physical description. Similarly, the definition of
spatial rigid translation relies only on arbitrary numerical assignments and, hence, does
not require any pre-existing geometrical notion such as that of affine connection.
Once this characterization of inertial frame is in place, absolute acceleration can be
reduced to the history of change of the spatial relations holding between an inertial and
a non-inertial frame: acceleration is part of the description of how much the pattern that
constitutes the history of a non-inertial frame deviates from the regularities encoded in
the inertial pattern as seen in an inertial frame. By the same token, any other absolute
quantity of motion such as, for example, angular momentum, can be shown to supervene
on the Humean mosaic.
Similarly, the regularities in the history of relations make it that Euclidean geometry is
the simplest and most informative geometry representing an embedding of that history in
an external space. This reasoning can be applied not only to space-like geometrical facts,
but also to time-like ones, as indicated in the preceding section: the history of change
in the distance relations in the universal configuration of matter exhibits an order that
is unique and directed. Time derives from this order in the sense that temporal facts
supervene on the history, i.e. an ordered sequence of instantaneous distance relations
making up the universal configuration of matter.
The same Humean strategy can be applied to dynamical parameters such as mass and
charge: these are means of representing the change in the spatial relations in the system
that achieves the best combination of being simple and being informative about that
change (see Hall, 2009, § 5.2). That is to say: it is not mass and charge qua properties
belonging to individual matter points that determine their trajectories by means of
the causal role that they play in the laws of classical mechanics and electrodynamics;
on the contrary, the trajectories that the matter points trace out through the whole
history of the universe make it that parameters such as mass and charge figure in the
dynamical laws such that a value of mass and charge applies to the particles taken
individually. Again, there is no commitment to surplus structure here in the sense
that there are no situations possible in which mass and charge exist, being properties
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belonging to individual matter points, but do not manifest themselves in any change
in the distance relations among the matter points. Mass and charge, etc. only are our
means of representation of the change that actually occurs.
Furthermore, this Humean strategy has recently been applied to quantum mechanics,
namely to the quantum theories that solve the measurement problem by being committed
to a primitive ontology of matter distributed in physical space (such as particle positions
in Bohmian mechanics): that distribution and its evolution then is the Humean mosaic.
The – universal – wave function supervenes on that mosaic, being a means to achieve
a description of that evolution that is both most simple and most informative, but
does not belong to the ontology (see Miller, 2014, Esfeld, 2014, Callender, 2015, and
Bhogal and Perry, 2016).
Again, our aim here is not to defend Humeanism. We only take up the fact that the
outlined sparse Humean strategy is by now well established as an option for classical
and quantum mechanics in the literature, whatever the pros and cons of this strategy
may eventually be. We employ this strategy here because we consider it to be, as
things stand, the only promising means to vindicate Leibnizian relationalism for general
relativistic physics, since this strategy shows a clear-cut way how to philosophically
interpret a non-relationalist physical theory as being committed to no more than a sparse
relationalist ontology. In particular, the sparse Humeanism that takes the Humean
mosaic to consist only in distance relations among matter points and the change of
these relations seems to be, as things stand, the only strategy that enables us to do
without a commitment to primitive geometrical facts in the ontology and to dismiss
fields, including notably the gravitational or metrical field of GR, from the ontology,
regarding them as representational means that supervene on the overall history of the
change in the distance relations among the matter points.
3 Leibnizian relationalism for general relativity: the challenges
The metric formulation of GR involves a set of tensor-fields defined over a four-dimensional
semi-Riemannian manifold. Using a local (i.e. component-based) language, we can cast
the field equations of the theory in the following form (κ being an appropriate constant):
Gµν [gµν ] = κTµν [φ, gµν ]. (1)
For simplicity’s sake, we omit the term involving the cosmological constant. The indices
µ and ν range from 0 to 3. The left hand side of (1), being dependent on the metric
tensor gµν , contains information about the geometry of the manifold, while the right hand
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side conveys information about the physical properties (e.g. energy density, momentum
flux) of the material sources mathematically modeled by the portmanteau φ, such as the
electromagnetic field.
This formulation makes clear that Leibnizian relationalism combined with the Humean
strategy faces what appears to be two knock down objections: in the first place, spacetime
in GR is inherently four-dimensional. There is no objective – that is, non-arbitrary –
way to distinguish spatial from temporal relations holding between events. This in
turn implies that there is no well-defined notion of spatial configuration in a Leibnizian
sense, which undermines the possibility to recover time in the way Huggett (2006) does
for Newtonian mechanics. Moreover, GR is considered as the paradigm example of a
field theory. Accordingly, insofar as there is a relationalism worked out for GR in the
literature, it is a relationalism that replaces spatial with spatiotemporal relations and
particles with fields (see Rovelli, 1997, for a prominent example and Pooley, 2001, and
Pooley, 2013, section 7, for a philosophical assessment).
Following this field relationalism, there is a plenum of fields instead of distance re-
lations between sparse points. However, one may wonder whether this relationalism is
worth its name, because there no longer is a principled difference with substantivalism.
The reason is the ambiguous status of the metrical field in GR: the metrical field im-
plements the geometry of spacetime, but it also carries energy and momentum. For the
substantivalist, the metrical field has a special status, being spacetime, since it contains
the geometry of the universe. For the field relationalist, it is a field interacting with
other fields. Both endorse the metrical field as an entity sui generis, the substantivalist
calling it “spacetime”, the field relationalist regarding it as a field among other fields.
The Leibnizian can resist the move to such a field relationalism: in GR as in any other
field theory, fields are tested by the motion of particles. There is no direct evidence of
fields. All the evidence is one of particle motion. Thus, all empirical determinations of
the gravitational field amount to observations of the motion of bodies in the sense of
change in the instantaneous spatial relations they stand in. As Einstein puts it,
The gravitational field manifests itself in the motion of bodies. Therefore the prob-
lem of determining the motion of such bodies from the field equations alone is of
fundamental importance. (Einstein and Infeld, 1949, p. 209)
Consequently, the field equations are there to determine the motion of bodies. This
opens the door for applying the Humean strategy also to GR: instead of buying into the
dualism of gravitational field and material bodies as suggested by Einstein and Infeld in
this quotation, one can maintain that the ontological bedrock – the Humean mosaic –
consists in the motion of bodies only. The gravitational field is a mere representational
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means that enables us to describe the overall motion of the bodies in a manner that
optimizes simplicity and information about that motion. Hence, the objection against
a particle ontology from GR being a field theory takes a piece of description (fields) for
a piece of ontology. This reasoning also applies to the account of purely gravitational
phenomena, such as spacetime singularities or gravitational waves. Also in these cases
all that is physically observable is the change of spatial relations among material bodies.
As mentioned in section 1, this Leibnizian stance cannot recognize all mathematically
possible solutions of in this case the field equations of GR as describing physically pos-
sible worlds. In particular, (1) allows for empty cosmological solutions, that is, models
in which the universe is totally deprived of matter, yet spacetime has, say, ripples and
lumps. These solutions have to be dismissed as mathematical surplus structure of the
theory; taking them ontologically serious would amount to inflating the ontology with
the gravitational field as a substance sui generis existing over and above matter. Again,
dismissing these solutions is no problem, since the world we live in undoubtedly is not
an empty universe. By the same token, also the solutions lacking (global) Cauchy hyper-
surfaces – that is, 3-surfaces that are intersected only once by any non-space-like curve
– have to be dismissed, since these solutions would depict cosmological models in which
it is even not possible to give a physical meaning to a space/time split.
Although all these solutions can be rejected as mathematical surplus without onto-
logical significance and although the objection from GR being a field theory can be
countered on the basis of all empirical evidence consisting in the motion of bodies, the
fact remains that the fundamental relations in GR seem to be spatiotemporal ones be-
tween events rather than distance relations between particles that change. This comes
out clearly even if one focuses only on models of spacetimes that admit space-like Cauchy
surfaces. Consider a solution of (1) consisting in a 4-geometry that includes wordlines
of material bodies, such that the manifold possesses a product topology Σ3 × R. Then,
we can reduce the physical description of this 4-geometry to the sum of descriptions on
a pile of three-dimensional Cauchy surfaces Σ3 that cut the manifold in the space-like
direction. The manifold can thus be foliated by a series of space-like leaves. Nonetheless,
the inherent four-dimensionality of GR shows up in the fact that the choice of the folia-
tion is not unique. In fact, for any sequence of Σ3 that we select, we always recover the
same four-dimensional physical representation including the worldlines of the material
bodies.
Consequently, the following result seems to impose itself upon us: instead of matter
points that are each separated by a distance from each other, with that distance in-
dividuating the matter points and changing, there are continuous sequences of matter
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point events, forming continuous lines (worldlines) that are individuated by the spa-
tiotemporal intervals between them. These intervals do not change. They all exist at
once. That is why this ontology is known as block universe: all the events throughout
the history of the universe exist at once. This four-dimensional ontology can be cast
in terms of a spacetime relationalism. No commitment to a spacetime that exists in
distinction from matter, with matter filling spacetime, is called for. Indeed, the famous
hole argument, going back in its contemporary form to Earman and Norton (1987), can
be seen as making a case for such a relationalism.
That notwithstanding, the relationalism endorsed by the proponents of the hole ar-
gument relies on a huge amount of geometrical structure, as does the field relationalism
mentioned above: these sorts of relationalism are committed to the metrical field being
part of the ontology, even if that field is considered as consisting in metrical relations
between point-events. By contrast, the Leibnizian relationalism advocated here does
not countenance any primitive geometrical facts. It accepts distance relations and their
change as primitive, whereas the geometry is a mere means of representing that change:
the geometry is fixed together with the dynamics as the means to achieve a description
of that change that strikes the best balance between being simple and being informa-
tive. Thus, distances neither are inherently three-dimensional or four-dimensional, nor
are they tied to Euclidean or Riemannian geometry. This ontology is centred only on
the distinction between distance relations, providing for variation within the configura-
tion of matter by individuating the matter points, and change of these relations. That
distinction is crucial for Leibnizian relationalism to achieve empirical adequacy.
By contrast, the distinction between variation within a given configuration and change
of that configuration gets lost in the block universe ontology. If one replaces point
particles with point events forming continuous lines, and a 3-geometry with a 4-geometry
to represent the relations between them, one obtains variation, but no change: the
relations represented in terms of a 4-geometry provide for variation within the block
universe. However, since these relations exist all at once, there is no change. Only when
we cut three-dimensional slices through the block and compare them, we can define
change in terms of the differences between such slices. But this change concerns only an
– arbitrary – description and not the ontology, since the ontology is the four-dimensional
block.
To include change, one therefore has to stipulate the following over and above the
global geometrical order characterizing the block universe (whatever the number of di-
mensions may be in which that geometry is formulated): the points on each worldline are
ordered according to earlier and later, with that order being unique and directed. Then
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there is a local time for each object (worldline), but no global time. Comparing different
points on each worldline, one can introduce change in terms of different spatiotemporal
intervals between different points on two worldlines. In this way, the spatiotemporal
relations provide for variation and change at once against the background of the points
on each worldline being ordered according to earlier and later.
There are, however, at least two drawbacks of this move: (a) temporal order has to be
presupposed as a primitive in this case, that is, the ordering of the points on a worldline
according to earlier and later. That ordering obtains as a primitive matter of fact,
independently of whether or not there is change in the spatiotemporal intervals between
these two lines. Hence, temporal order is not derived from change, but change is derived
from the order of the points on each worldline being temporal. What is the difference
between ordering the points on such a line according to, say, below and above and
ordering them according to earlier and later? That difference is primitive. Consequently,
one cannot do without endorsing a primitive temporal, metrical requirement on the
block universe ontology, even if one casts this ontology in relationalist terms instead of
endorsing a spacetime substance.
(b) The question then is whether endorsing a primitive temporal order of the points
on each worldline is sufficient for empirical adequacy. There is no possibility to introduce
becoming and the passage of time: there is a local temporal order of the points on each
worldline, but since these points exist all at once, there is no such thing as becoming in
the ontrology. Becoming and the passage of time have to be relegated to consciousness
being a point moving on such a line in a fixed direction. As Weyl famously put it,
The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my conscious-
ness, crawling upward along the life line of my body, does a section of this world
come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time (Weyl,
1949, p. 116).
Consequently, it is doubtful whether paying the price of a primitive temporal order
is worthwhile, since doing so does not give us the phenomenology of time. Leibnizian
relationalism, by contrast, easily recovers this phenomenology on the basis of endorsing
change as primitive.
These considerations are by no means conclusive, but they show again that the ontol-
ogy of the natural world is a matter of philosophical argument and cannot be read off
from the formalism of a physical theory. When it comes to ontology, it is worthwhile
investigating the option to take the 4-geometry as a means of representation instead
of endorsing it as constituting the ontology of GR in the guise of a block universe. It
is true that the distances making up the Leibnizian configuration of matter points and
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their change cannot be specified uniquely in GR. However, this may just show that
fundamental space-like facts can be described in different yet equivalently simple and
strong ways. One should not conclude from this descriptive underdetermination that
there are no fundamental space-like, Leibnizian facts, on pain of losing the parsimony of
the ontology.
This situation is in a certain sense analogous to the one of the quantum Humeanism
mentioned at the end of the preceding section: on Humeanism applied to Bohmian
mechanics, for instance, the particle positions and their change throughout the history
of the universe make up the Humean mosaic. However, due to the universe being in
quantum equilibrium, our knowledge is limited to what can be obtained by applying
Born’s rule. Furthermore, there are at least two different formulations of Bohmian
mechanics – the standard one and the identity-based one – that agree on the accessible
facts, but disagree on the particle trajectories (see Goldstein et al., 2005a,b). Thus,
the Humean mosaic cannot be uniquely specified in the Bohmian primitive ontology
approach. In general, a limit of accessibility applies to any primitive ontology proposed
for quantum mechanics (see Cowan and Tumulka, 2016). Nonetheless, the argument for
these theories is that they solve the measurement problem by providing an ontology and
a dynamics that make unique measurement outcomes intelligible. Hence, the issue of
what is the Humean mosaic is one of ontological argument and not whether or not the
Humean mosaic can be uniquely described or is accessible to observation.
Indeed, our main access to the Leibnizian relations is through the way in which they
change, that is, through the evolution of the distance relations among the matter points.
It may then turn out that the simplest and most informative description of that evolu-
tion is formulated in terms of instantaneous action at a distance, thus involving a unique
specification of the spatial relations among the particles, as in classical gravitation; or
it may turn out that the simplest and most informative description of that evolution
is formulated in terms of retarded action, as in field theories from classical electromag-
netism on (or in terms of retarded and advanced action, as in relativistic theories of
direct particle interaction). In this case, the instantaneous distance relations among the
particles do not figure in the dynamics, although it is their change that the dynamics
seeks to capture. Again, this is a matter of what type of description turns out to achieve
the best balance between being simple and being informative about the change in the
empirical world, instead of being a matter of ontology. The measure for ontology is
parsimony and coherence together with empirical adequacy, not the dynamical variables
that figure in a particular physical theory.
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4 Interlude: shape dynamics
Recent progress in physics provides a further argument to vindicate the Leibnizian per-
spective on space and time in general relativistic physics. Gomes et al. (2011) show that
there is an alternative theory defined on the phase space of GR. Such a theory is not just
alternative, but dual to GR in the sense that, under the appropriate choice of gauge, the
dynamical trajectories of the two theories coincide. This dual theory is Barbour’s shape
dynamics (see Gomes and Koslowski, 2013, for a concise presentation).
Leaving aside technical considerations, the important philosophical consequence of
this duality in classical (that is, non-quantum) gravity is that there are two metaphysi-
cal stances with respect to space and time that are compatible with the empirical pre-
dictions of general relativistic physics. The first one is the irreducibly four-dimensional
perspective of GR, the second one is the three-dimensional perspective of shape dynam-
ics. In this theory, dynamics can be depicted as a succession of (conformal) 3-geometries.
Unlike GR, this theory is not invariant under change of foliation. Instead, this charac-
teristic symmetry of GR is traded for a local conformal symmetry, which means that
the geometry defined on each folio lacks a privileged notion of scale – it is not size, but
shape that matters.
In shape dynamics, there is a well-defined notion of instantaneous spatial configura-
tion. This fact does not imply that instants are referred to an external clock ticking in the
background. What exists is a succession of spatial configurations that can be arbitrarily
labeled by a monotonically increasing parameter; but this succession is not in time. On
the contrary, it defines a “time-like” direction for the unfolding of the dynamics. Hence,
shape dynamics is compatible with Leibniz’ (and Mach’s) view of space as the order of
coexistence (i.e. bodies related by spatial relations) and time as a bookkeeping device to
describe the order of change (i.e. the succession of instantaneous spatial configurations).
We do not claim that shape dynamics fully implements the ontology of Leibnizian
relationalism. First of all, also this theory is a field theory. Secondly, at this stage,
the theory has been worked out only for pure gravity (but see Gomes and Koslowski,
2012, for some first results for gravity/matter coupling). Thirdly, this theory includes
irreducible geometric facts regarding angles (that is, a conformal structure) contra a
fundamentally geometry-less ontology. However, as argued in section 2, it would be
a misunderstanding to require that a relationalist ontology has to be vindicated by a
physical theory that employs only relationalist representational means. The point at
stake here is that the GR/shape dynamics duality hints at the fact that there exists a
privileged way to conceive the Humean mosaic – which corresponds to the appropriate
gauge where the two theories coincide in phase space – and that such a conception is
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fully compatible with a Leibnizian take on space and, most importantly, time. To put
it in the terms of Gryb and Thébault (2016), gravity is “Janus-faced”: it is compatible
both with a block universe where there is variation of local matters of fact but no change
(and, hence, no time ordering change), and with a dynamical universe where there is
change in the guise of change in the fundamental relations that connect the fundamental
objects, on which temporal facts supervene in the form of a monotonically increasing
parameter labelling the succession. In short, the duality of GR and shape dynamics again
shows that one cannot read the ontology off from the formalism of a physical theory,
since one would in this case end up with two proposals for the ontology of general
relativistic physics that contradict each other, based on two different formalisms for
general relativistic physics. The ontology has to be settled by criteria such as parsimony
and coherence together with empirical adequacy.
5 The Humean strategy applied to general relativity
Against this background, let us now try out for GR the Humean strategy that Huggett
(2006) developed to vindicate a Leibnizian relationalist ontology for Newtonian mechan-
ics. The distance relations among point particles and their change throughout the entire
history of the universe are the Humean mosaic. As in the classical case, we can define
an adapted frame of reference as one in which a certain particle is always at rest at the
origin. We can then relate all such reference frames by means of rigid spatial transla-
tions. We look as usual for regularities in the history that admit a particularly simple
yet strongly informative description.
The problem that we face in this respect is that there is no such thing as classical
inertial motion in GR: this theory merges inertial structure and the gravitational field.
Consequently, there is no unique way to separate them, let alone find a case where
the gravitational part of the sum vanishes in a region bigger than a point. Hence,
the description that we search for cannot be encoded in a law of the form x¨µ = 0 (a
dot indicates the usual differentiation with respect to an arbitrary time-like parameter
defined along a given pattern); in this case, we would be dealing with a Newtonian world
rather than a general relativistic one. Nonetheless, even if we cannot make use of the
concept of inertial motion in GR, still we can employ a generalization of this concept:
the simplest and most informative description of the regularities in a general relativistic
world is that of geodesic motion (more precisely, non-space-like geodesic motion), that is,
x¨µ+Γµ
νσ
x˙ν x˙σ = 0, using an appropriate (affine) parametrization. Geodesic motion is a
well-defined concept in GR, since the theory stipulates that the motion of freely-falling
14
bodies follows geodesic trajectories. Here we immediately see that the (Levi-Civita)
connection with coefficients Γµ
νσ
is not a geometrical feature crafted so to speak in the
Humean mosaic: it is just a tool that helps to formalize how the description will change
among different observers moving geodesically – in other words, a description of how
different frames adapted to freely-falling bodies and related by rigid spatial translations
– differ.
Note that we do not presuppose the existence of a spacetime structure (in particular, a
connection) that defines what it is for a motion to be geodesic, but, rather, the other way
round: we define geodesic motion as a particularly simple pattern in the entire history of
relational change. Then we construct a connection as a bookkeeping device that accounts
for the relational differences among different geodesics: there are no primitive geometrical
facts, just descriptive tools taken from the language of (differential) geometry. Similarly
to the classical case, also here there might actually be no body moving geodesically:
what we require is just that any other adapted frame can be related to a geodesic one
by means of a spatial rigid translation. If this is not possible, then the possible world
we are dealing with does not admit the laws of general relativistic physics as theorems
of the simplest and strongest system.
It is also worth noting that, in the Newtonian case, the coefficients of the connection
do not arise, because all inertial motions are identical, which is consistent with the
fact that Newtonian spacetime admits a flat connection (i.e. the simplest and strongest
description of inertial motion is one for which Γµ
νσ
= 0). In the general relativistic case,
by contrast, geodesic motions might in fact differ even when adopting the same affine
parametrization (what is usually called “geodesic deviation”, which is at the root of the
explanation of how tidal forces arise). From this point on, all the relevant geometrical
and dynamical features of the theory can be shown to supervene on the Humean mosaic
in the usual manner. For example, curvature is a simple and informative way to describe
relational change between freely-falling bodies. More generally, the metrical structure
gµν of spacetime supervenes on geodesic motions through the usual relation Γ
µ
νσ
=
1
2
gγµ
(
gσγ,ν + gγν,σ − gνσ,γ
)
(a comma indicates standard differentiation with respect to
the subsequent index). Geodesic trajectories also suffice to fix the topology of spacetime,
as shown in Malament (1977). Note that, by construction, the geometrical description
encoded in Γµ
νσ
and gµν does not inhere within single trajectories, but supervenes on
the totality of geodesic motions. In this sense, the continuous large-scale geometry of
spacetime results from a coarse-grained description of the entire history of relational
change among particles.
In general, all fields – including, as we have seen, the metrical one – are in this
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framework shortcuts to describe certain forms of particle motion. Hence, the relationship
between particles and fields is not physical – particles do not generate fields, nor are
they pushed by fields –, but descriptive: a particle-vocabulary can be coarse grained
to a field one in order to simplify the description of gravitational phenomena without
loss of physical information. Clarifying this point is very important because if we took
particles and fields on a par and, in particular, regarded particles as field sources, then
singularities would arise. This is all the more true for GR. In this theory, a Schwarzschild
radius is associated to any extended body, which depends on the body’s mass: roughly
speaking, if the body’s extension drops below this radius, then the body collapses into
a black hole singularity. It is then obvious why, in GR, this notion of massive point-
particle makes little sense besides some particular approximations. However, it should
be clear by now that our notion of particle is not the one just discussed.
By the same token, quantities such as momentum densities, energy flows and the like
can be constructed out of the field-vocabulary. For example, the stress-energy tensor Tµν
figuring in (1) does not refer directly to the underlying particle motions, but expresses
their field-like description; it is, so to speak, a description of how a description changes.
What has been said so far shows that there is nothing strange in claiming that a large-
scale continuum theory such as GR (i.e. a theory used to model continuous material
systems at astrophysical or cosmological scales) admits an extremely sparse ontology.
That notwithstanding, these results do not show that the central law of GR, namely the
field equations (1), can be recovered from the Humean mosaic as a theorem of the system
that strikes the best balance between simplicity and strength in describing the change
in the distance relations among the point particles that occurs throughout the history
of the actual world. Indeed, thus recovering the field equations (1) of GR is outright
impossible for the following reason: if the Humean mosaic are distance relations among
sparse matter points and their change throughout the history of the universe, we can
obtain geometry and dynamics in a package as the system that optimizes simplicity and
information in the description of that change. However, geometry and dynamics remain
distinct, as in the classical case. In other words, the dynamical laws that describe such
a Humean mosaic are those of a theory formulated over a fixed (albeit non-Euclidean)
background. There is nothing in the regularities of motion of such a Humean mosaic
that could lead to a higher-order description where geometry is coupled to matter in a
dynamical way. The ontology of there being only distance relations and their change
is too meagre to get (1) from such a possible world by Humean means: the most we
can get is a possibly very complex, but still non-dynamical geometry compatible with
the geodesic law of motion. This is because geometry supervenes on the mosaic by
16
means of the law of geodesic motion, while non-gravitational fields come out as a way
to describe non-geodesic motion: given this construction, there is no way to conjecture
any inter-dependence between geometry and material fields.
Nonetheless, this result can be accommodated in an ontology of there being only
distance relations among sparse matter points and their change that does justice to
general relativistic physics. Consider the class of cosmological solutions of (1) (modulo
those that we have previously discarded as mathematical surplus): each of these models
describes a possible world in which GR holds. These models are each characterized by
a certain metric gµν (compatible with the Levi-Civita connection) and a certain stress-
energy tensor Tµν . The main difference that this cluster of possible worlds bears with
respect to a cluster of Newtonian worlds is that the Newtonian worlds always feature
the same spatial and temporal metrical structures. By contrast, in general, gµν co-varies
with Tµν from world to world in the GR case. This is one possible sense in which
we can understand what is known as the background independence of GR: the same
spatiotemporal structures of Newtonian mechanics appear in all Newtonian models, so
that they are nomologically necessary; spatiotemporal structures in GR, by contrast, are
nomologically contingent.
Against this background, what (1) represents is the manner in which in any possible
world of GR, spatiotemporal structures described by some metric tensor gµν are corre-
lated with material structures described by a stress-energy tensor Tµν . That is to say: in
any possible world of the Leibnizian ontology of distance relations among sparse matter
points and their change in which GR is valid, the system that strikes the best balance
between simple and being informative about a particular such world is one in which a
dynamics describes the evolution of the configuration of matter over a fixed background
– that is, a particular cosmological solution of (1) describing a particular possible world
of GR. The general law (1) then is not a theorem that generalizes the regularities within
a world, but a trans-world generalization: it expresses the relationship between the
mathematical structures formulating the geometry and the mathematical structures for-
mulating the dynamics in any possible world where GR is the best system describing
the change in the distance relations among the point particles. In sum, we propose
a generalization of the Humean account that Huggett (2006) developed for Newtonian
mechanics that shows that geometry and dynamics supervene on the Humean mosaic of
Leibnizian relations at each world by means of a geodesic law; we then obtain Einstein’s
field equations as the simplest and strongest description of the correlation between ge-
ometry and dynamics for the whole class of these worlds. We submit that this, then,
is the way in which Leibnizian relationalism can be put to work in general relativistic
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physics, leaving open whether taking everything into account this is as serious an option
for general relativistic physics as Leibnizian relationalism is for classical mechanics.
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